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Pokhran II told both Islamabad and Beijing that deterrence is a two-way street

How did the Union Cabinet react to Pakistan's first set of nuclear blasts? Nobody says it aloud, but the reigning emotion was relief.

What was the reaction upon hearing of Pakistan's second set of tests? Indifference!

The Vajpayee ministry opted for nuclear weapons for two reasons. The major reason was India's commitment to a more equitable world order. The second was countering Pakistan's tactics in Kashmir.

Let me begin with the long-term goal. For fifty years India took the stand that it is immoral for five nations to have a monopoly on nuclear weapons. Both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty perpetuate nuclear apartheid.

Matters came to a head with the CTBT. Not enough attention was paid to the crucial Entry into Force clause. Briefly, it said the CTBT would not be operational unless a select group of nations, India chief among them, signed up.

The deadline was September 1999. Had India persisted in refusing, the clause specified that other powers take measures, a delicate threat of sanctions. In other words, India would have endured sanctions even if Pokhran if never happened.

India wouldn't have problems with the CTBT if recognised as a nuclear weapons state. But that is counter to American policy, and we lack political clout in Washington.

Now turn to Pakistan. Fifteen years ago, Islamabad concluded India couldn't be beaten in conventional warfare. The twofold solution was feed terrorism to "bleed" India and simultaneously build a nuclear arsenal.

General Zia summed it up while giving the green signal to 'Operation Topac' (the plan to destabilise Kashmir). "Let us take control of the valley. If we have the bomb, it will deter India from taking it back."

Pakistan has had nuclear weapons for ten years. It didn't need to test since their bombs are Chinese designs. India's defence strategy since the late 1980s has always assumed Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state.

But Vajpayee's predecessor didn't apply their minds to either problem: neither the threat to Kashmir nor formulating a long-term nuclear doctrine. As L K Advani said, Indian policy was essentially "reactive", responding to what others did.

How did Pokhran II help? First, it told both Islamabad and Beijing that deterrence is a two-way street. Second, it forced Pakistan to react.

The Vajpayee ministry knew perfectly well that sanctions would be imposed. But once imposed on India, Pakistan too had to be squeezed. The difference is that the Indian economy is far more robust than that of Pakistan. (Indian reserves of hard currency are roughly thirty times that of Pakistan to take but one indicator.)

Pakistan's threshold of pain is far below that of India. Pressed beyond a point the whole nation could just disintegrate. Either that, or Islamabad would take desperate measures like selling technology to Iraq for hard cash.

The United States has just two options. It can squeeze Pakistan and risk all hell breaking loose. Or it can renegotiate the CTBT to suit Pakistan.

By definition, accepting Pakistan as a member of the nuclear club means giving the same privileges to India. But it suits India to let Islamabad argue the case for renegotiating unfair treaties with its old friends.

However, for this to happen it was essential that Pakistan carry out nuclear tests. What really scared Indian strategists was the possibility that Pakistan would accept some lollipops from the West and chooses not to test.

Had Pakistan not tested, it would definitely have been the gainer. It would still have had its Chinese bombs in the basement. And it would also have had its long-denied F-16 planes and lots of soft loans to tide over its economic crises.

Hence the relief in Delhi when Islamabad announced that it had tested its weapons. The bonus was that it became amply clear, as the Americans openly admit that Pakistani technology is well behind India's.

Once Pakistan tested its weapons, a second round was a strategic irrelevance. Islamabad was more than welcome to use up its scarce reserves of fissible material. A second test could hardly tilt the strategic balance.

The Opposition blamed the BJP for starting a nuclear arms race. This was stupid given that Pakistan owned Chinese bombs ten years before Pokharan II. But that isn't the point.

American insistence on signing the CTBT unconditionally and Pakistan's obsession about "matching" India used to be problems for us. Nobody in Delhi can say so openly, but the after-effects of Pokhran II have made Pakistan an American headache, not ours!

T V R Shenoy