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The Rediff Special/ Salman Haider

Is some rethinking of policy towards Afghanistan now needed?

The recent hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814 by a group of criminals whose identity remains shadowy riveted the nation's attention for a week and the after-shock is still being felt. Every move of the aircraft, every step to secure the release of the hostages, took place in the unrelenting glare of television cameras and under the scrutiny of a host of more-or-less expert commentators.

Many of the questions raised at the time are still with us and will continue to be heard for some time yet. Among these is the late, almost perfunctory, reaction of countries in the West that present themselves as worldwide leaders in the fight against terrorism. Why did India's dilemma when confronted by a murderous bunch of hijackers elicit only bare, pro forma acknowledgement in the crucial first days?

Feebly, the timing of the hijack on Christmas eve was suggested as an excuse: everyone was on holiday. Later attempts to make good the initial laxity through statements by US President Clinton and British Prime Minister Blair, among others, only underlined the early lapse. A stern, immediate worldwide condemnation in such a situation could serve to discourage the criminals and back up the efforts of the rescuers.

But this was only the start. As the hijacked aircraft went from Amritsar to Lahore to Dubai and finally to Kandahar, it unavoidably drew in more and more foreign administrations and enlarged the international dimension of the crisis. The Pakistani authorities were outwardly correct in their handling of the unbidden arrival, offered their co-operation and shooed off the aircraft as fast as they could to its next destination, Dubai. As became evident later, India was not convinced by this show of innocence, but events were moving fast and the plane had left Lahore before any serious disagreements on how to handle it could emerge.

At Dubai, there was a more exacting exchange. The plane was diverted to a military base where access was strictly controlled. The Indian ambassador was denied entry and thus could do little to fulfill his instructions, which were to persuade the UAE authorities to detain the aircraft. They, however, seemed only too eager to be rid of it, and it flew off to its final destination, Kandahar, which may have been where the hijackers had always wanted to go.

At this point the Indian government's dilemma became even more acute. The Taleban of Afghanistan are regarded as being hand-in-glove with the various militant groups in Kashmir. In this, they are virtual partners of Pakistan and its ISI in the decade-long effort to destabilise Kashmir. In choosing Kandahar as their destination, the hijackers seemed to have gone where they would receive support and succour.

To complicate India's task, it has no diplomatic contact with the Taleban. Nor could it expect any favours from them, for in Afghanistan's prolonged civil war, Indian political and moral support has been extended to the mortal rivals of the Taleban, the Tajik faction led by Ahmed Shah Masoud, whose administration is recognised as the legitimate government of the country. Yet it was from these same Taleban that India had somehow to win the means to secure the release of the hostages.

In the event, once they had settled down to it, the Taleban proved reasonably helpful and effective. They responded to approaches from the Indian external affairs minister -- conducted, for want of any other means, by satellite telephone -- provided minimum services for the incarcerated passengers, mediated in the negotiating exchanges, held the balance between the two sides and ultimately sent hostages, hijackers, released prisoners and the aircraft from their soil without any further mishap. No wonder they received repeated acknowledgement of their helpfulness from India's minister.

What is the explanation for this apparent change of direction? Why didn't the Taleban use the hijacking to promote their own agenda and to conjure up further trouble for India, especially in Kashmir? Not enough is known about the event to encourage an answer to these questions. Indian commentators have tended to see the Taleban as taking the opportunity provided by the incident to improve their international image and to widen their diplomatic contacts. There may be something in this, for the Taleban certainly came across as convincing interlocutors, supple and alert, a functioning State apparatus rather than an embattled Afghan faction.

Nagging questions remain nevertheless: were the hijackers given more arms while they were in Kandahar, why was their identity not revealed, where did they go when it was over, and how, were they guided by someone in so shrewdly shaping and shifting their demands, and so on. Whatever be the truth of the relationship between the hijackers and the Taleban, the part played by the latter in dealing with the crisis has left some longer term questions for India to handle.

Can the Taleban continue to be ignored and denounced as a malign, fundamentalist State bent on doing damage to India, or do the country's interests demand a move, however cautious, to open links with Kabul? The Kandahar episode proved that we can do business with them. Is some rethinking of policy towards Afghanistan now needed?

An intriguing comment out of Washington suggests that America may have played a helpful part during the crisis by facilitating contact between Indian negotiators and the Taleban. This appears strange, for the Taleban are the keepers of Osama bin Laden, top of America's list of wanted terrorists. It may be that, notwithstanding their differences on this particular case, America and the Taleban maintain a connection which has been usefully invoked in the recent crisis.

The international aspect of the hijacking took on an altogether new dimension in the aftermath. India's investigations led it to conclude that the entire incident was instigated and fashioned by Pakistan. A direct accusation to this effect was made by high Indian authorities. Evidence was released to back up the complaint. A big effort was undertaken internationally to nail Pakistan as a terrorist State, to be ostracised and suitably punished by the international community.

Predictably, Pakistan denounced India's accusations as false, and claimed that it was trying to divert attention from its own mishandling of the affair. Relations between the two countries, already in a trough, dipped even lower, and remain there. But the call to label Pakistan as a terrorist State was rather summarily dismissed in Washington and in London: the evidence, it seemed, was insufficient. Lately, the familiar drumbeat of demands for dialogue in South Asia is again to be heard, tending to drown out the Indian charge of Pakistani complicity.

There, more or less, is where the matter rests. India's satisfaction at the safe return of the hostages cannot blot out the sense of a mishandled affair which showed huge defects in the country's capacity to handle a crisis. Nor has the international dimension of the event provided any compensatory satisfaction.

Salman Haider, a former member of the Indian Foreign Service, served India as ambassador to China and, then foreign secretary. He was also appointed high commissioner to the United Kingdom after his retirement.

The Rediff Specials

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