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The Rediff Special/ Lieutenant General E A Vas (retd)

The armed forces cannot prevent a repetition of Kargil

The third Indo-Pak War of 1971 resulted in a Pakistani debacle. Two previous wars had resulted in UN-imposed ceasefire lines, CFLs. This time it was India that declared a unilateral ceasefire. The Simla Accord resulted in agreement between the two prime ministers by which the Line of Actual Control was surveyed on the ground by a joint military team from both countries and delineated on a map.

This was renamed the Line of Control, LoC, which would be honoured by both countries and would not require UN supervision. Both accepted that there was a J&K dispute, which would be resolved through bilateral talks between the two countries.

The hawks in Pakistan knew that a direct military confrontation with India could never succeed. They decided to recruit and train young men as mujahideen -- freedom fighters. Since a very low percentage of these volunteers are genuine Kahmiris, it would be more appropriate to refer to them as foreign militants or mercenaries rather than freedom fighters. After training, the militants were formed into small groups under a selected leader. The plan was to secretly infiltrate these groups across the LoC into Muslim-inhabited areas of J&K to foster insurgency and commit acts of terrorism.

The scheme was initiated in the mid-70s. To begin with this had great success because it is impossible for an army to seal a LoC of this length over mountainous terrain; moreover, there were disgruntled locals who gave shelter to infiltrators. Our security forces adopted fresh tactics and concentrated their attention on vulnerable villages.

Over the next few years, Kashmiris grew fed up with foreign mercenaries who kept demanding free food, shelter and women. Many began reporting the presence of infiltrators. Security forces soon got an upper hand and began killing or capturing over 20 infiltrators every week.

By the early 80s, Pakistani-sponsored mercenaries were no longer eager to infiltrate into J&K because their chances of survival were very slim. This period saw the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the stoppage of military and financial aid to Pakistani-sponsored anti-Soviet militia in Afghanistan. Pakistani army units already deployed in Afghanistan continued to provide direct military support to the Taliban. However, armed mercenaries who could no longer be financed began to leave Afghanistan. Pakistan was engulfed by a wave of unemployed Islamic militants including some who were being funded by the self-proclaimed terrorist Osama bin Laden.

Nawaz Sharief had been elected as Pakistan's prime minister with a two-thirds majority on a "friendship with India" election manifesto. His political opponents disapproved of his moderate policies. They welcomed the presence of militants and sought their support for a fundamentalist approach to social problems.

In order to offset domestic pressures, the prime minister announced that he was introducing the Sharia. His critics were not satisfied with this. They were unhappy that friendly links were developing between India and Pakistan. They kept demanding that Sharief display a more aggressive approach towards India.

In order to keep restless militia groups busy and political opponents quiet, Pakistani strategists suggested a scheme wherein the army supported by militia groups would establish a small enclave across the LoC at a place, which would be tactically strong and hurt India. They believed that India's conventional military superiority had been neutralised by Pakistan's nuclear weapons. There was therefore little risk of their limited plan escalating into a full-fledged war. They were sure that this would result in the intervention of the US and UN and a reopening of the J&K issue to Pakistan's advantage. Nawaz Sharief accepted the concept in outline.

Pakistani military planners selected a place of intrusion along a 140-km stretch of the LoC, which overlooks NH1A in the Kargil area. About 300 civil and military vehicles use this road between the months of April and October. The ground level of the region depicted on the sketch is at an average height of more than 10,000 feet above sea level. NH1A runs through Drass and Kargil which are small villages consisting of crude stone houses located on the tree line at about 10,000 feet above sea level. These are inhabited by shepherds during winter. These houses served as halting places when mule columns used this path to Leh.

The LoC, which is uninhabited, runs parallel and north of the road at about 17,000 feet above sea level. NH1A at its nearest point is about 10 km away from the LoC. The names shown on the LoC are grazing grounds visited by shepherds in summer. The LoC has always been in India's possession. Military outposts are located here in summer. And vacated in winter.

Pakistani military officers approached their task in a Methodical, professional manner. From April 1998 onwards, using Skardu as the headquarters, they moved a brigade group (about 5000 regulars) into the area and began preparing three defensive bases along their side of the LoC. Each of these was located at a height of about 10,000 feet above sea level and was occupied by about 1,500 infantrymen, artillery guns, anti-aircraft missiles and about 500 militia.

Once the men were fully acclimatised to operate at heights above 15,000 feet, each base began erecting sheds on the slopes close to the top of dominating features on their side of the LoC. These were located so that shepherds or patrols could not see them from viewpoints on the Indian side of the LoC. Militia and regulars were used as porters to carry ammunition, fuel, snow clothing, mines, rations and other stores from the bases to the sheds, a distance of about 5 km. Each porter load had to be broken up into 25-kg packs. It is unlikely that any porter did more than two trips a day. This arduous task was completed by September 1998, before the onset of snow. All the men except a few sentries returned to the base for winter. Till now, Pakistan had technically not violated the LoC.

The snow melted early in April 1999. Using the bases as a launching pad, Pakistan moved a mixed force of about 100 regulars and militia to the shed area. Half the number began preparing strong defences 500 m on the Indian side of the LoC. The other half, about 50 men, advanced about 5 km across the LoC into three widely separated sectors of Tiger Hill, Tuloling and Batalik. They were supported by mule transport and about 100 porters, mostly mercenaries stiffened by a few regulars. They carried essential stores from the sheds to the forward defences. Artillery guns were so located in the bases that these could support the forward sectors and also engage targets moving on NH1A. The intruders included artillery observers. Soldiers were dressed as mercenaries and were armed with machine guns, mortars and hand-held anti-aircraft weapons.

Pakistan knew that this intrusion would eventually be detected. They expected India to complain about Pakistan's breach of the sanctity of the LoC. They planned to counter Indian protests by stating that these were Kashmiri freedom fighters and disclaiming any control over them. The forward defences were located about 5000 feet above Drass, Kargil and Batalik. Intruders were confident that it would be very difficult for an attacking force to dislodge them from such formidable positions. Pakistan assessed that Delhi would hesitate to widen the conflict by attacking elsewhere across the LoC.

The USA had been their ally during the Cold War and the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan. America had sided with Muslim Kosovars against Christian Serbs on a human rights issue. Pakistan was confident that America would side with its old Muslim ally against Hindu infidels on the question of defending the human rights of Kashmiri Muslims. It hoped that the US and the UN would intervene to prevent an escalation of the fighting and would take prompt steps to settle the J&K issue in Pakistan's favour.

Shepherds from Kargil told local Indian commanders about the presence of intruders in early May. (An enquiry on why our intelligence agencies, air and ground surveillance were unable to detect the build up of Pakistani forces and their subsequent intrusion has since been instituted.) It was initially assumed that this was a routine sighting of infiltrators on their way into the valley. Attempts to round them up proved disastrous. It was only after suffering casualties that the extent and strength of this aggression was realised. Military higher command ordered local commanders not to attack these positions, to watch them and collect detailed information on the locations and strength of the enemy.

Meanwhile force levels were built up for a major assault. The government told the nation that this was no ordinary infiltration but deliberate aggression. The eviction of the enemy would be costly and take time. The world was informed of these events through diplomatic channels.

A series of tough battles were fought during the latter part of May. Attacking infantry soldiers made slow gains. It was decided to use air power and that proved very effective. One aircraft crashed due to engine failure. The pilot was seen to eject. (He was captured and later handed over to the Indian high commission at Islamabad.) A missile shot down an aircraft, which was sent to investigate this crash. The pilot ejected and was captured. His body was subsequently returned. He had been murdered by two shots fired at point blank range. The bodies of six jawans who had been captured in an earlier encounter were also returned. Post-mortem examinations revealed that they had been tortured and their bodies mutilated.

The nation was outraged by this barbaric disregard of the Geneva Convention. The government was urged not to handicap the armed forces. They should be permitted to fight on ground of their choosing. The prime minister declared he was confident that our forces would eject every single intruder. However, our armed forces would not cross the LoC unless national interests demanded this. The US government praised India for showing restraint. It advised Pakistan to withdraw the intruders, respect the sanctity of the LoC and abide by the Simla Accord. The Group of Eight nations later repeated this advice.

By mid-June our forces, using improved tactics, were attacking the enemy rear by night and his flanks by day. Patrol actions at night intercepted a column of 40 mules carrying supplies to the intruders. Several porter and relief columns were also ambushed and killed. Infantry attacks by day, supported by artillery and air, captured flank positions and threatened to cut off the enemy who were forced to fall back from forward spurs. The enemy was now being denied close observation of NH1A. (There was never any danger of Leh being cut off. An alternative though longer road to Leh had already been constructed via Himachal Pradesh.) A search of enemy dead indicated that these were mainly regular soldiers.

By the last week of June the intruders were confined to several small localities on Indian territory. Pakistan's request for a discussion on Kargil was turned down. There would be no talks until every intruder was withdrawn, the sanctity of the LoC and the Simla Accord accepted.

Nawaz Sharief flew to China on a six-day visit. He returned after two days when China also advised him to respect the LoC. Pakistan with a shaky economy now faced military defeat, international condemnation and rejection by China. The last jolt was a US Congress panel, which urged the Clinton administration to use economic measures to enforce a Pakistani withdrawal if necessary.

On July 3, Nawaz Sharief requested a meeting with President Bill Clinton. He flew to Washington on July 4. The Indian prime minister was also invited to attend but he declined the invitation, as it was not convenient. America's only leverage against Pakistan is economic, and President Clinton warned Sharief that this would be used if required.

Sharief requested for US or UN intervention. He was given no face-saving exit. He was told to adopt the bilateral approach, withdraw from across the LoC and abide by the Simla Accord. Sharief's strongest argument was his fight for survival. Clinton assured him that he would take a personal interest in the Indo-Pak talks. Before leaving Washington, Nawaz Sharief announced that he was ordering a withdrawal of intruders.

By now Tiger Hill was in Indian hands and the defences elsewhere were crumbling. On July 11, at Pakistan's request, senior military officers from both countries met at the Attari border post to discuss the modalities for a Pakistani withdrawal. Both sides agreed to keep 1000 m away from the LoC and not prepare any new defences in that zone. India agreed to suspend ground and air attacks up to the morning of July 16, by which time all intruders must be withdrawn.

The next day front line soldiers confirmed that enemy rear-ward movements were taking place. Pakistan later requested an extension of the deadline by one day. India agreed to this. Pakistan reported that the withdrawal was complete on July 17. Till then, our armed forces had suffered 414 casualties, including 25 officers; 596 wounded including 35 officers, and 4 missing. It is estimated that Pakistan suffered fewer casualties; one brigadier and 40 officers were reportedly killed.

Our ground forces edged forward towards the LoC with caution as the area was strewn with abandoned wounded men and many dead bodies, booby traps and anti-personnel mines. On July 21, our troops whilst approaching the LoC were subjected to intense artillery shelling and came under machine-gun fire from enemy positions about 500 m ahead of the LoC.

By July 26, the enemy had thinned out everywhere except from small localities on the LoC itself, and some on the Indian side of the LoC opposite Mushkoh, Drass and Batalik. It would be impossible for our forces to adopt envelopment tactics to dislodge them without crossing the LoC.

Since the alignment of the LOC in this area is quite clear, the presence of these intruders was a breach of Pakistan's assurance that it would withdraw beyond 1000 m to their side of the LoC. Negotiations took place to clear any misunderstanding. Meanwhile sporadic shelling continued and our troops suffered another 50 casualties.

Anxious citizens ask: "Can the armed forces prevent a repetition of such intrusions?" The simple answer is "No". Improved intelligence and surveillance systems may provide early warning of hostile intentions, so that forces can be alerted and vital targets protected. But no army in the world can protect every inch of its national soil against Kargil-type incursions. The sanctity of a border between two nations is a matter of trust. An aggressor breaks his word and crosses a border, only because he calculates that this will benefit him. The best deterrence against a prospective aggressor is therefore to make it obvious, always, that he will suffer militarily, diplomatically and economically if he crosses your border.

Lieutenant General E A Vas (retired) is the founder member of the Pune-based Indian Initiative for Peace Arms Control and Disarmament.

The Rediff Specials

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