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The Rediff Special/Savita Pande

Indo-Pak dialogue -- A damp squib

That the Indo-Pak dialogue in Colombo would not be much of a success was a foregone conclusion. Pakistan's insistence on "nothing but Kashmir first" continued to dog the talks and, was, more than any other reason, responsible for the failure of the talks.

India, on the other hand, had made it clear right from the beginning that Kashmir would be one of the issues, and not the issue. It is, therefore, not without reason that Pakistan should have described the exercise as a "waste of time."

The last day of the talks, in particular, came as a rude shock. Pakistani foreign office spokesman Tariq Altaf accused Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of "unilaterally" announcing that the two sides had agreed on resumption of talks. He said Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief had only said, "The two sides had agreed to continue the talks at the next available opportunity." A normally cool-headed foreign secretary described Islamabad's behaviour as that of a "neurotic" individual, with its "obsessive focus on a single issue or a one-point agenda."

This essentially meant that Indians stuck to the June 23, 1997 position when both sides identified "eight issues of concern" to be addressed "in an integrated manner" -- Jammu and Kashmir, peace and security, confidence building measures, Siachin, Wular barrage project, Sir creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and commercial co-operation, and promoting friendly exchange in various fields.

The foreign secretaries were left to determine the mechanism, including working groups at various levels. And it was decided that the first two of these would be discussed at the foreign secretary level. Since then the foreign secretaries have met several times, and so have the prime ministers, but no solution seems to be on sight.

After the May nuclear blasts by both countries, Pakistan now insists that the two sides discuss these two issues first and take up the other issues later. Media reports have quoted former Pakistani foreign minister Gohar Ayub Khan as having said that "Kashmir is the flashpoint and with both the countries being nuclear weapon powers, it can erupt anytime... These issues must take priority. We have been telling the Indians that the situation has changed since May. Let us discuss these two issues. We can work out a time-frame for discussion on other six issues and take them up later." India of course has flatly rejected this.

There are some who argue that India should have accepted Pakistani challenge and agreed to have a dialogue on Kashmir. The Indian diplomats, especially those engaged in negotiations, do not agree.

They feel that discussing Kashmir exclusively - that is, without talking about issues like ending hostilities along Siachen or improving trade relations -- is fraught with problems. This is because given the Pakistani role in the proxy war in the area in particular, and its approach to the issue in general, it would prevent any kind of understanding or agreement on the issue.

As a consequence, Pakistan, would -- underlining the fact that bilateral dialogue has not paid off -- once again raise the bogey of third-party mediation.

The Pakistani delegation also issued a non-paper, proposing eight confidence-building measures for reducing tension in Jammu and Kashmir. These included strengthening of the UN military observer group to patrol both sides of the LoC; release of Kashmiri detainees; removal of Indian army pickets in Srinagar and other Kashmiri towns and villages; phased reduction of Indian troops in the valley; cessation of search/ arrest operations; transmission of information about missing persons; stationing of the Red Cross and UN human rights monitors in Kashmir and recognition of the All-Party Hurriyat Conference.

The idea of distributing this paper was obviously to catch the eye of the international media, copies of the non-paper were distributed to the media.

Needless to say, India rejected these outright, reiterating its stand of Kashmir being an integral part of India and that New Delhi would brook no outsider interference.

Both sides are under pressure from the international community to get the dialogue going. Neither wants to be seen as backing out of the process. The Indian assessment is that the Pakistanis may not succeed in linking the nuclear issue with Kashmir. They, of course, would like to see the process of dialogue restarted before the next round of talks between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Jaswant Singh.

With the above-stated insistence on treating Kashmir as the "core issue," Pakistan was overly optimistic to have expected any drastic outcome different from the traditional ones through a couple of meetings between the foreign secretaries or even the prime ministers.

As Islamabad finds that post-Pokhran pressures on India begin to abate, and Pakistan has to make crucial decisions on the nuclear front before the next round of talks in Washington later this month, it is likely to make a last ditch effort to internationalise the Kashmir issue.

It is in this light that Pakistan-abetted killings need to be seen. In fact as time approaches for the third round of US-Pakistan nuclear dialogue, Pakistan is likely to step up belligerence across the LoC.

The recent spurt in killings also highlights the deficiency in Indian security policy, in general, and information warfare in particular. There is a need for setting up a dedicated command and integrated intelligence network. This displays Pakistan's sophisticated nuclear blackmail tactic. There is a strong need to educate the people in general that we are fighting a war in a new dimension.

This can only be done when the efforts of the state and central agencies are integrated into an effective network. The same time, efforts should be made to disseminate information through the media to expose Pakistan's game plans, its concerted efforts at ethnic cleansing and abetting terrorism.

The prime minister has already made a unilateral, no-first use declaration in the Lok Sabha. China has already done so years ago when it conducted its first explosion. International pressure should now be sought upon Pakistan to make a similar pledge. Refusal by Pakistan to do so would again expose its intentions.

Part of the explanation also lies in the Indian government's inept handling of its own nuclear status and failure to maintain consensus on foreign policy, which gives Pakistan room to press on with its combined strategy of increased firing across the LoC, intensified terrorism and heightened nuclear blackmail.

All eyes are now set on the opportunities for the two countries to hold discussions. These include the Non Aligned Summit in August, the United Nations General Assembly in September, and the Commonwealth Summit in November as opportunities for fresh talks.

Savita Pande is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India's premier defence think-tank.

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